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ARGUMENTS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF




We are loath ... to believe that radio preaching will ever
become popular or successful. The fad will soon blow
over . . . Any general adoption of the radiotelephone
would be a positive disservice. One cannot worship over
a telephone wire.I
These lines from the Chicago Northwestern Christian Advocate
of 1922 demonstrate the early skepticism that greeted even the
thought of religion on the public airwaves. Yet that journalist
in the 1920's would have been chagrined to find what broad-
cast religion or "televangelism" has become. Not only has Sin-
clair Lewis' Elmer Gantry moved from the tentmeeting circuit
to the radio "ether"; he (and female counterparts) have
appeared in profusion on the front pages of our newspapers
and tabloids, have testified and lobbied in the halls of Con-
gress, and have permeated that most intimate of American
entertainments, the living room television set.
With the advent of television, broadcast religion has
become a bigger business than many could have imagined. In
1987, the National Religious Broadcasters reported the exist-
ence of 414 religious TV stations.2 One writer estimated that
two new outlets were opened somewhere in the United States
each month.3 Of larger moment is the income garnered from
broadcast evangelism. Estimates of a total dollar figure have
been placed in excess of $2.5 billion.4 According to one
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1. Preaching by Wireless, 72 CURRENT OPINION 650 (1922).
2. Nicholas, The Quiet Revolution in Christian Broadcasting, RELIGIOUS
BROADCASTING 20 (Feb. 1987).
3. Id. at 20.
4. W. Martin, Perennial Problems of Prime-Time Preachers, address
given at Baylor University, Waco, Texas, Oct. 20, 1987, at 9.
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report, the most visible TV ministries were receiving $100-200
million a year. 5
If, however, "love offerings" and Arbitron ratings are the
indicia of success, televangelism appears to be in trouble. The
controversial personalities of the early days of radio, such as
Aimee Semple McPherson and Father Charles Coughlin, have
been replaced by the better known names of Jim and Tammy
Bakker, Jimmy Swaggart, et al.6 According to a recent Christian-
ity Today article, the charges of financial and other types of
impropriety leveled at the Bakkers, Swaggart, and Oral Roberts
have taken their toll on religious broadcasters in general.7
Viewing and fundraising is off not only for Swaggart and Rob-
erts, but also for others perceived to be untouched by scan-
dal-Robert Schuller, Jerry Falwell, and Pat Robertson.8 The
great lamps of religion, however, will not be snuffed out; at
most they will be replaced in popularity by newer faces or by
those who had been less visible previously.9
To argue whether broadcast religion fulfills the Christian
"Great Commission"'" to evangelize the world or serves some
5. Praise the Lord and Pass the Loot, 303 THE ECONOMIST 27 (May 16,
1987).
6. March 1987 was a month that shook broadcast evangelism. PTL
(Praise the Lord) shook from revelations that its founder, Jim Bakker, had
paid large sums of money for a former staffer not to tell of her sexual
encounters with him. PTL's accounts raised eyebrows at the Internal
Revenue Service and the Evangelical Council for Financial Accounting. That
same month, Oral Roberts locked himself in his Tulsa prayer tower and
claimed that God would "call him home" unless his ministry received $8
million by month's end. Less than a year later, evangelist Jimmy Swaggart,
who had been scathing in his remarks about Bakker's improprieties, would be
accused of soliciting the services of a prostitute in Louisiana to perform
sexual acts before him. Praise the Lord, id. at 23-24, 28; for a complete
discussion of the Bakker affair, see L. MARTZ & G. CARROLL, MINISTRY OF
GREED (1988); for the initial Swaggart episode, see New York Times, Feb. 20,
1988, at 9, col. 1; Feb. 21, 1988, at 30, col. 1; Feb. 22, 1988, at 1, col. 1; and
Feb. 27, 1988, at 7, col. 1.
7. Frame, Surviving the Slump, CHRISTIANITY TODAY 32-34 (Feb. 3, 1989).
8. Id. at 33.
9. For example, the Rev. D. James Kennedy, of Coral Ridge Ministries,
Coral Ridge, Florida, is one televangelist whose ministry has grown both in
terms of audience and donations. Christianity Today reports a projected
increase from $12.1 to 16 million dollars income for the 1988 fiscal year,
while other major broadcasters felt indirect effects of scandal. Kennedy was
one of few newcomers to testify before Congress. Frame, id. at 34; Federal Tax
Rules Applicable to Tax-Exempt Organizations Involving Television Ministries:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
10. Matthew 28:18-20a: "Then Jesus came to them and said, 'All
authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Therefore go and
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other public good would belabor a controversy that has waxed
and waned since radio came into being. To frame the question
in moral terms would shift the focus of an easily polarized
issue. But to cast the discussion in an appropriate fashion, this
paper will discuss the phenomenon of televangelism as an issue
of public policy. Religious broadcasting certainly includes the
aspects mentioned above, but it also encompasses questions of
regulatory jurisdiction and the much larger question of consti-
tutionality. This latter concern can not be understood without
an investigation of the former; accordingly, this article will dis-
cuss the constitutionality of religious broadcasting in light of
the problems found within the pages of its regulatory history.
The history of government regulation reveals a reluctance
to intervene in religious broadcasting affairs, to the point that
prosecution of such broadcasters only occurs after sustained
publicity. This history is explored in three parts. Part I shows
how the government's early concern over religious broadcast-
ing gave way to a more "laissez-faire" approach, allowing a
Judeo-Christian emphasis to appear, with the possible implica-
tion of a government "imprimatur." Part II examines the
apparently inadvertent favor given religious broadcasting
through both general Federal Communication Commission
(FCC) requirements for station licensure and current deregu-
latory trends. Part III looks at other regulatory dilemmas
posed by church-state concerns between religious broadcasters
and agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and
others. These sections serve as a backdrop for Part IV, in
which it is argued that the very existence of religious broadcast-
ing violates both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the first amendment. Finally, Part V sets forth
the argument that religious broadcasting has perverted the
entire meaning of religion.
I.
In this section, a brief broadcast history reveals the tacit
but patent interrelationship between religion and the mass
media. Indeed, one finds many of the early radio stations and/
or broadcasts to have been sectarian in nature." This early
history demonstrates how the great number of religionists on
the air merely exacerbated an already chaotic problem of signal
make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of
the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything I have
commanded you.'"
11. See infra this section, part A.
1990]
768 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 4
interference due to a lack of government control. Religious
radio enjoyed an experimental period as legal efforts employed
by the Department of Commerce to ride herd on broadcasting
failed.' 2 Congress met the need for regulation with the Federal
Radio Act of 1927.1' Although permitted to broadcast under
this act, religious organizations came to be viewed as "propa-
ganda" stations by the Federal Radio Commission (FRC).' 4
During this time, the commission codified the free-market phi-
losophy that has permeated American broadcasting to this day.
The commercialism of that era took its toll on religious broad-
casters. Only the strong survived.' 5
At the same time, however, commercial broadcasters, like
their "educational" and "propaganda" counterparts, were
required by the FRC to serve the "public interest, convenience,
and necessity."' 6 The successor to the FRC, the Federal Com-
munication Commission (FCC), continued this requirement,
but dropped the "propaganda" label with regard to religious
programming.1 7 In this era (1934-1940), the percentage of
"sustaining" programs decreased, and the FCC abdicated a
policy-making role as it deferred to the emerging radio net-
works (in the form of NBC and CBS) and to self-regulatory
efforts (under the aegis of the National Association of Broad-
casters [NAB]), creating, perhaps unintentionally, a predomi-
nantly Judeo-Christian electronic church.' 8
Since 1940, the increasing commercial influence on reli-
gious broadcasting has been felt in several ways. First, the
value of airtime induced profit-minded broadcasters to dimin-
ish any sustaining time previously available. Catholic and
mainline Protestant broadcasters, accustomed to free airtime,
were reluctant to pay. Fundamentalist and conservative
denominations stepped in to fill the void.' 9 Second, the major
network's hold on religious broadcasting loosened as local affil-
12. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
13. Federal Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, 69th Cong., (1927).
14. F.R.C., Ann. Report 3 (1929).
15. Schultze, Evangelical Radio and the Rise of the Electronic Church, 1921-
1948, 32J. OF BROADCASTING AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA 292-95 (1988).
16. See Federal Radio Act, supra note 13, at section 11; see also M.
Edelman, The Licensing of Radio Services in the United States, 1927 to 1947, 31
ILLINOIS STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 9 (1949-1950).
17. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, § 312, 73d Cong.
(1934).
18. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
19. A. REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 315 (1985).
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iates acquired greater autonomy from the networks.2" A third
factor, that of changing attitudes of government agencies, is
discussed in sections II and III. These factors have contributed
to the landscape of religious broadcasting as we know it today:
a multi-million dollar industry, programming replete with char-
ismatic personalities, aired seven days a week on local stations
and on cable.
A. The Early Days of Radio: Religion and Regulatory Chaos
The early history of radio discloses a seminal link between
broadcasting and religion in the United States. The following
discussion examines three aspects of this link: the willingness
of some religionists to adopt radio as an evangelistic medium;
the controversy over whether radio should be used by religion
at all; and government efforts to curtail general abuses of the
medium, with a focus on the effect of these efforts on religious
broadcasters.
Radio was placed originally under the jurisdiction of the
Departments of Commerce and Labor in 1912.21 Necessarily
broad in scope, the Radio Act declared "[t]hat a person, com-
pany, or corporation within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall not use or operate any apparatus for radio commu-
nication as a means of commercial intercourse among the sev-
eral States.... 22 With the advent of broadcast stations in the
1920's, the government, especially the Department of Com-
merce under Secretary Herbert Hoover, was hard pressed to fit
the law to the evergrowing radio industry. Although the 1912
Act provided some guidelines for non-governmental use of the
airwaves, 23 the breadth of the law eventually resulted in chaos.
Religious broadcasting played no small role in the
problems of broadcast regulation. Just as nonsectarian stations
and programs sorely tested the governmental restrictions on
power, frequency, and commercialism, so did their religious
counterparts. Perhaps part of this attitude stemmed from a
20. Frankl, A Hybrid Institution, 5 CRITICAL STUDIES IN MASS
COMMUNICATION 258 (1988).
21. Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 264, § 1 (1912).
22. Id.
23. Id., Reg. 15, which states, in part: No private or commercial station
not engaged in the transaction of bona fide commercial business by radio
communication or in experimentation in connection with the development
and manufacture of radio apparatus for commercial purposes shall use a
transmitting wave length exceeding two hundred meters, or a transformer
input exceeding one kilowatt, except by special authority of the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor contained in the license of the station....
1990]
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belief, among more optimistic religionists, that radio was just
one more tool that God had provided to spread religion to the
ends of the earth.2 4 One of the earliest radio broadcasts was
that of a church service from the Calvary Episcopal Church in
Pittsburgh, onJanuary 2, 1921.25 Although the liberal rector of
the church, Edwin J. VanEtten, regarded the attempt as an
experiment, the weekly service would become a feature of
KDKA, the nation's first station licensee. 26 The floodgates
were opened. By 1923, approximately 2% of radio licenses
were held by religious organizations. 27 By the following year,
this figure had doubled.28
Although one critic has argued that "[e]vangelicals were
far more optimistic about radio than were their mainline Prot-
estant counterparts, it is important to note that the Federal
Council of Churches (today the National Council of Churches)
had recognized the potential of radio and began the program
"National Radio Pulpit," featuring prominent mainline preach-
ers of the day.30 An extended history of religious broadcasting
in the 1920's reveals, however, the non-mainline backgrounds
of so-called "early giants." 3' Pioneer evangelists Paul Rader
and R. R. Brown, both associated with the Christian and Mis-
sionary Alliance, began their broadcasts in 1922 and 1923,
respectively. Brown's reaction to the report of a conversion
through his Omaha broadcast in April, 1923, perhaps voices
the height of enthusiasm for radio as an evangelical medium:
"Hallelujah! Unction can be transmitted!"-
32
As noted earlier, not everyone believed that the public air-
waves were an appropriate forum for religious display.
Although some quietly voiced concern that the church is a
place where people gather together to worship, and that per-
haps radio would decrease church attendance, others framed
the issue in terms of public harm. In 1924, H. Maxim wrote in
The Nation:
24. See infra note 32.
25. Miller, Radio and Religion, 177 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF Po. AND SOC. SCIENCE 135 (1935).
26. B. ARMSTRONG, THE ELECTRIC CHURCH 20 (1979).
27. BANNING, COMMERCIAL BROADCASTING PIONEER: THE WEAF
EXPERIMENT 1922-1926, 132 (1946).
28. Armstrong, Religion's Raid on Radio, POPULAR RADIO 3-10 (1925).
29. Schultze, supra note 15, at 290.
30. OBERDORFER, ELECTRONIC CHRISTIANITY: MYTH OR MINISTRY? 18
(1982).
31. B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 26, at 20-24.
32. Id., quoted at 23.
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"Let the Women's Christian Temperance Union and the
Anti-Saloon League have control of the evening radio
talks to children, and they will be in a position to fill their
minds with superstitions and make them into men and
women who shall be pawns of propagandists of blue laws
and prohibitions." 33
In 1927, The Christian Century questioned whether religion on
the air was a "community friend or community nuisance." 4
If controversy over radio's utility created debate within
religious circles, religious broadcasting's existence contributed
to the regulatory headache developing at the Commerce
Department. The growth of religious radio, from both church
and station sites, coincided with increases in the number of
educational stations and those owned by large companies. The
Commerce Department, until 1925, gave broadcast licenses to
all and sundry.35 But the Fourth National Radio Conference,
held in Washington, resulted in Secretary Hoover telling appli-
cants that all wavelengths were in use and that no further
licenses would be granted. The result was an unregulated buy-
ing and selling of licenses, apparently condoned by the Com-
merce Department. 6
Government policy thus resulted in a paradox: existing sta-
tions could change hands without federal intervention, yet the
Commerce Department seemed to be arbitrary in its awarding
of new licenses. Such practices brought into question whether
Secretary Hoover and his subordinates had the right to make
such decisions under the 1912 Radio Act. Court challenges
arose, encouraged by AT&T's successful case against station
WHN, New York, for the right to sell broadcast telephone
lines, essential for transmission. 7 The case was settled out of
court, but the subsequent license fees paid to AT&T by many
stations for "pickup lines" led to these stations resorting to
commercial sale of time to recoup the outlay for such fees.
The commercialization of radio inadvertently brought
changes to religious broadcasting. One result was fundraising.
WJR, Detroit, for example, went commercial, and by 1926, had
religious programs on a paid basis. Furthermore, they per-
suaded Father Charles Coughlin to experiment in fundrais-
33. Maxim, Radio-the Fulcrum, 91 THE NATION (July 23, 1924).
34. Should Churches Be Shut Off the Air?, 21 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY (May
12, 1927).
35. E. BARNOUW, 1 A TOWER IN BABEL: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN
THE UNITED STATES 172-78 (1966).
36. Id. at 174.
37. Id. at 176.
19901
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38 39ing; 8 the results were staggering. Coughlin would go on to
become one of religious broadcasting's better known figures.40
Commercialization also challenged the authority of Com-
merce Secretary Hoover under the 1912 Radio Act. The equiv-
ocal attitude of the Department in the mid-1920's had some
interesting results for religious broadcasting. On the positive
side, the number of religiously-based stations peaked in 1925
at 71. 4 1On the negative side, wavelength and power questions
were debated via letter and telegram by all types of broadcast-
ers. The most famous of these is one sent by Aimee Semple
McPherson, founder and preacher of the Foursquare Gospel
Temple in Los Angeles. When threatened with a shutdown of
her religious radio facility by the government for deviations
from broadcast frequency, her wire to Secretary Hoover
expressed her God-given right to broadcast:
PLEASE ORDER YOUR MINIONS OF SATAN TO
LEAVE MY STATION ALONE STOP YOU CANNOT
EXPECT THE ALMIGHTY TO ABIDE BY YOUR
WAVE LENGTH NONSENSE STOP WHEN I OFFER
MY PRAYERS TO HIM I MUST FIT INTO HIS WAVE
RECEPTION STOP OPEN THIS STATION AT
ONCE
4 2
Although her station complied with the order by getting a
broadcast engineer on its broadcast site, McPherson's chal-
lenge did not go unheard. Others of a less doctrinaire stance
did not perceive that the Radio Act provided the Commerce
Secretary with as much authority as that which was being exer-
cised at the time. In addition, the battles between network
forerunners such as AT&T, Westinghouse, and others exacer-
bated the problems in an already unwieldy domain of jurisdic-
tion. When finally challenged in Court, the Department was
stripped of its power to regulate the airwaves at all.43
It can be argued, then, that religious broadcasting is
merely a footnote in early broadcast history; but its contribu-
tions to the radio chaos of the 1920's cannot be ignored. That
religious broadcasting existed at all not only created a sectarian
controversy but added to the regulatory problems of the Com-
38. Id.
39. See generally Brown, Selling Airtime for Controversy: NAB Self-Regulation
and Father Coughlin, 24 J. OF BROADCASTING 199-224 (1980).
40. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
41. SUMMERS & SUMMERS, BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC 35 (1966).
42. Quoted in BARNOUW, supra note 35, at 180.
43. United States v. Zenith, 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Il. 1926).
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merce Department in terms of license grants and wavelength
assignments. Had the number of religious stations not grown,
others might have stepped in. This can not be known for sure.
The fact remains that religious radio added to the regulatory
din faced by Secretary Hoover. The government's next
attempt at radio regulation, however, would have severe reper-
cussions upon religious broadcasting until the creation of the
Federal Communications Commission in 1934.
B. Regulation Arrives: The Federal Radio Commission
(1927-1934)
Although its jurisdiction in broadcast history was relatively
brief, the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) helped shape the
landscape of religious broadcasting in terms of stations and
programming. First, the FRC winnowed the number of reli-
gious stations through a less accommodationist stance toward
radio licensing. Second, it prepared the shift from sustaining
to paid religious broadcasting through its tacit support of com-
mercial broadcasting in general.
The Radio Act of 1927 gave the newly created FRC the
power to regulate broadcasting in a manner not granted the
Department of Commerce. The FRC created a distinction
between commercial and noncommercial stations, and placed
religious broadcasters within the latter group. As such, they
were lumped with educational stations and reassigned a limited
number of frequencies."4 A year after the new regulations took
effect, the number of religious station licensees decreased from
70 to 50. 45 Additional FRC requirements forced many non-
commercial stations off the air by 1930.46
Unfortunately for religious stations, the FRC did not favor
them as much as it did noncommercial, educational stations.
The new agency classified sectarian licensees as "propaganda
stations. ' ' 47 Furthermore, all broadcast stations were to offer
"well-rounded program[s]." The FRC declared that:
[T]o best [sic] serve the public .. . there is no room for
the operation of broadcasting stations exclusively by or
in the private interest of individuals or groups . . . As a
general rule particular doctrines, creeds and beliefs must
44. SUMMERS & SUMMERS, supra note 41, at 39.
45. Schultze, supra note 15 at 292-293.
46. Id.
47. F.R.C., Ann. Report 3, 34 (1929).
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find their way into the market of ideas by the existing
public-service stations.48
Religious broadcasting, then, was found to be "too narrow" in
its appeal to listeners.49 Therefore, those who stayed on the air
had to determine the fine line between education and doctrine,
or face possible charges by the FRC. For example, WMBI, the
voice of the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago, kept in close
contact with the FRC, and took care to conform to legal and
engineering standards.5 °
Of those broadcasters who opted to seek sustaining or
commercial time on "public service" stations, a survey taken in
1933 of 325 radio stations regulated by the FRC provides some
indication as to the religious confessions represented in early
radio. 5' These stations provided a sample of 3,820 religious
programs. Only 416 of these were "commercial advertisers;"
608 provided no identification of religious affiliation. How-
ever, the predominance of "conventional Protestant" programs
is striking. This category included 1,088 programs, compared
with 336 "irregular Protestant" and 328 "fundamentalist Prot-
estant" programs. Roman Catholic programs number 151,
with Jewish, Christian Science, and Mormon broadcasts (in that
order) considerably fewer.52 The survey reveals the predomi-
nance of Christianity (especially mainline) in religious broad-
casting. One must assume that the licensee's mandate did not
forbid a station from exercising some preference as to which
confessions would receive airtime.
Thus the FRC set the stage for an important development
in religious broadcasting. Those who maintained a station
license were subject to strict guidelines to avoid totally sectar-
ian content. Those who wanted to broadcast but could not
maintain a station of their own could seek access to commercial
stations and radio networks.5" Although the commercial
nature of broadcasting might allow a shift in preference, the
sound of religious broadcasting was predominantly mainline
48. Id.
49. T. CARTER, M. FRANKLIN, &J. WRIGHT, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
THE FiF-rH ESTATE: REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA 333 (1986). The
charge of "narrow appeal" has reappeared in recent years; see Multiple and
Religious Ownership of Educational Stations, 54 F.C.C.2d 941 (1975).
50. Schultze, supra note 15, at 293. B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 26, at 25-
26.
51. W. J. DuBourdieu, "Religious Broadcasting in the United States,"
98 (1933) (unpublished dissertation available from Northwestern University).
52. Id.
53. Schultze, supra note 15, at 293-96.
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Christian. The successor to the FRC, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC), would dictate how these legacies
would be worked out in the coming decades.
C. The FCC and Regulation by Proxy: 1934-1940
The transition from the FRC to the FCC has been
described as a "cleanup period," in which the agencies turned
their attention "to quacks, cranks, and swindlers, driving the
worst of them from the airwaves." 54 What is important to rec-
ognize here is that the Federal Radio Commission did not have
the staff to deal with the variety of radio matters pressed upon
it by an ever changing medium.55 Yet Congress enlarged the
scope of concern with the Federal Communications Act of
1934.56 The new Federal Communications Commission was to
have jurisdiction over "all forms of interstate and international
telecommunication; ' 57 the powers sought by the Department
of Commerce under the 1912 Act were now a reality, but in the
form of an all-encompassing agency. The responsibilities
entailed in the new law subsumed the Radio Act of 1927 and its
amendments.
Two trends in religious broadcasting mark the first decade
of the FCC-one that favored less-traditional, evangelical
broadcasters and another that allowed a more mainline Protes-
tant focus. In either case, the market and regulatory forces pro-
moted by the FCC (and earlier by the FRC) created a religious
broadcast milieu Judeo-Christian in emphasis.
Since FRC policies remained in place, religious broadcast-
ing continued to seek sustaining time in a highly commercial
market. This was more difficult for non-mainline denomina-
tions and their preachers. As Qj. Schultze has noted, most
evangelical broadcasters looked to commercial stations for air-
time, and had to generate money to pay for this time.58
Requests for donations became important to the broadcast
evangelist who was not part of a major denomination. As sta-
tions decreased the amount of sustaining time available, dona-
tions would help defray the cost of obtaining commercial
time. 59
54. WHITE, THE AMERICAN RADIO 127.
55. Id. at 156.
56. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, 73d Cong. (1934).
57. Id.
58. Schultze, supra note 15, at 295.
59. The trend toward commercial time being devoted to non-mainline
broadcasters would occur both in radio and television. See infra notes 72 and
78 and accompanying text.
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Sustaining time, however, was not limited to the station
level. The major networks also had such time available. Net-
work policies toward religious broadcasting dictated a less doc-
trinaire message than non-mainline broadcasters would prefer.
Although they adopted radically different policies, the Colum-
bia Broadcasting System (CBS) and the National Broadcasting
Company (NBC) promoted religious pluralism. CBS, on its
"Church of the Air," set aside one hour each Sunday to provide
time for a variety of confessions. A rotation system allowed
access to thirteen denominations in all; thus, any person who
listened would receive a "balanced" view of religion.60 Addi-
tionally, CBS would not sell time to other religious groups.
"Church of the Air" was its sole, sustaining program. Access
was provided only to "major faiths" of the religious
community.
61
In contrast, NBC limited religious airtime to representa-
tives of Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism only. The net-
work provided five guidelines; 62 two excerpts are most
enlightening. First, the broadcaster's message was to be "non-
sectarian and nondenominational in appeal."63 Second, the
message was to be of "widest appeal; presenting the broad
claims of religion, which not only aid in building up the per-
sonal and social life of the individual but also aid in populariz-
ing religion and the church."'  CBS saw religious broadcasts
60. Miller, supra note 25 at 138.
61. Id.
62. NBC's complete guidelines were as follows:
1. The National Broadcasting Company will serve only the central or
national agencies of great religious faiths, as for example, the
Roman Catholics, the Protestants, and the Jews, as distinguished
from individual churches or small group movements where the
national membership is comparatively small.
2. The religious message broadcast should be nonsectarian and
nondenominational in appeal.
3. The religious message broadcast should be of the widest appeal;
presenting the broad claims of religion, which not only aid in
building up the personal and social life of the individual but also aid
in popularizing religion and the church.
4. The religious message broadcast should interpret religion at its
highest and best so that as an educational factor it will bring the
individual listener to realize his responsibility to the organized
church and to society.
5. The national religious messages should only be broadcast by the
recognized outstanding leaders of the several faiths as determined
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to be a positive, socializing force. Like NBC, CBS favored tacit
recognition of a generalized American faith, and opposed sec-
tarian interpretations of the Gospel. Through such policies,
endorsed by the Federal Council of Churches, this approach,
ecumenical in scope, but diluted in dogma, maintained a
favored position for some time.
65
The late 1930's brought about concern over how much
control local stations should be able to exercise with regard to
programming. One major event in this debate occurred when
the FCC ruled against rigid programming requirements placed
upon local affiliates by the major networks.66 As a result, sta-
tions had more discretion as to how much time they would fill
with network programming. During the 1940's, wartime pros-
perity placed a premium on commercial time; stations were,
therefore, able to devote less sustaining time to religion.
Another aspect of station control arose in the form of a
trade association, the National Association of Broadcasters
(NAB). The now famous NAB Code in 1939 set down guide-
lines in keeping with the network standard that requires reli-
gious programs to be nonsectarian and noncontroversial.67
According to J. A. Brown, the revised Standards of Practice
Code was developed, in part, to avoid the excesses of such
political religious broadcasters as Father Coughlin, who
attacked President Roosevelt and political actions of the day on
his programs.68 Self-regulatory efforts, then, implicitly favored
a mainline Protestant viewpoint.
In short, network efforts to provide sustaining religious
programming promoted a broadly-based, Americanized Chris-
tianity, one aimed at a diffuse mass audience. At the same time,
the commercialization of American broadcasting, permitted to
burgeon under the FRC and the FCC, allowed non-network
programs to continue to be dominated by Protestant denomi-
nations, with paid programming becoming increasingly evan-
gelical or fundamentalist. Whether conservative or liberal,
however, religious broadcasting was of a publicly palatable
Judeo-Christian stripe.
D. Religious Broadcasting and its Commercial Evolution
The face of religious broadcasting, as one would recognize
it today, took shape in the increasing commercial environment
65. See generally OBERDORFER, supra note 30, at 13-29.
66. F.C.C., Report on Chain Broadcasting, Order No. 37 (1941).
67. Brown, supra note 39, at 210-11.
68. Id. at 211.
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of the 1940's. In this section, we describe how religious broad-
casting made the transition from radio to television; how the
networks repeated their efforts at affiliate control in the early
television era; and how, as network control loosened,
televangelism became increasingly commercial, barely distin-
guishable from secular television.
The non-mainline religious broadcasters of the 1930's and
40's appreciated the entrepreneurial nature of the task that
they faced.69 To counteract the mainline hold on the networks,
independent and conservative religious broadcasters worked at
the station level. According to Q. J. Schultze, "[b]y the late
1940's radio stations derived 'a good proportion of their
income from the sale of time for religious purposes.' "7o To
further increase their share of the market, evangelicals created
their own interest organization in 1944, the National Religious
Broadcasters (NRB). 7 ' The impact of these trends was great.
When commercial stations started charging even mainline
broadcasters for time in the name of profit, fundamentalists
and evangelicals continued to pay for scarce airtime when the
former would not.7 2 Religious radio, however, did not remain
the haven for conservative American Christianity. Television
changed the landscape of religious broadcasting.
Like network radio in the 1920's and 1930's, network tele-
vision in the 1950's was dominated by the three major commu-
nions: Catholics, mainline Protestants, and Jews.73  The
dominance can be traced to the fact that the networks applied
to 50's television the same policies that they had used a genera-
tion earlier to deal with religious radio broadcasts."4 Although
theFCC75 and the IRS76 have played a role in the shift toward a
more conservative picture of televangelism, the savvy with
which fundamentalists and evangelicals approached television
reveals that they had learned from their radio experience. His-
69. See supra notes 39 and 59; see generallyJ. HADDEN & C. SWANN, PRIME-
TIME PREACHERS: THE RISING POWER OF TELEVANGELISM 103-24 (1981).
70. E. WILLIS, FOUNDATIONS IN BROADCASTING: RADIO AND TELEVISION
(1951), cited in Schultze, supra note 15, at 296.
71. OBERDORFER, supra note 30 at 23.
72. A. REICHLEV, supra note 19.
73. P. HORSFIELD, RELIGIOUS TELEVISION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
3 (1984).
74. Id. at 3-6; see also O'Brien-Steinfels & Steinfels, The New Awakening:
Getting Religion in the Video Age, CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION 26 (Jan./Feb.
1984); R. Abelman, Ten Commandments of the Electronic Church, CHANNELS OF
COMMUNICATION 64 (Jan./Feb. 1985).
75. See infra section II.
76. See infra section III, part A.
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tory would repeat itself primarily because of network attitudes
toward broadcast religion.
The networks, ever-mindful of profit, eventually adjusted
their policies to allow commercial time for monied televange-
lists. By 1959, 53% of all religious programs on television
came from purchasing producers. 77 In the 1960's, the net-
works loosened their hold on local television affiliates, just as
they had for radio earlier. This gave local stations greater
autonomy to sell time to religious sponsors without the threat
of network sanctions. 78
Along with FCC regulation changes, 79 the full-scale com-
mercialization of religious television has yielded a definitely
conservative cast to televangelism. Today's religious broad-
casters have reaped the benefits from the foresight of Billy Gra-
ham, Oral, Roberts, Rex Humbard, and others who had
recognized television's potential in the 1950's.8° In addition,
commercial television has influenced the style of the later gen-
erations of broadcast evangelists. Religious broadcasting has
become increasingly entrepreneurial and, as a result, increas-
ingly less differentiated from secular television."'
Televangelism shares many similarities with its host
medium. Fundraising has become closer in kind to a sales
pitch than an appeal for offerings. As one author has succinctly
put it, "fundraising is a major task of the technology of saving
souls and television market shares." 2 In 1985, a survey of
financial appeals revealed a variety of items offered in exchange
for donations: Bibles, books and pamphlets, display items,
magazines and newsletters, tapes and records.8 3 In all fairness,
however, it must be noted that explicit requests for funds are
77. Abelman, Financial Support for Religious Television: The Impact of the
PTL Scandal, 1 J. MEDIA ECON. 24 (1988).
78. Frankl, supra note 20, at 258.
79. See infra section II, part A.
80. B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 26, at 83-84, 86-89, 91-99; see also H. W.
Fulmer, "Traditional American Itinerant Preaching in the Television Age:
The Evangelism of Billy Graham," paper presented at the annual meeting of
the Speech Communication Association, New Orleans, LA (1988). W. F.
Fore has termed these three men as the archetypes of the first, second, and
third generations of televangelists, respectively. See W. FORE, TELEVISION
AND RELIGION: THE SHAPING OF FAITH, VALUES, AND CULTURE 82-83 (1988).
81. W. FORE, supra note 80, at 84.
82. R. FRANKL, TELEVANGELISM: THE MARKETING OF POPULAR
RELIGION, 128 (1987).
83. Abelman & Neuendorf, How Religious is Religious Television
Programming?, 35J. COMMUNICATION 107 (1985).
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limited to a smaller percentage of religious broadcasters than
one would surmise from the popular press.84
The current generation of televangelists is similar to secu-
lar broadcasting in more ways than just fundraising, however.
85
For example, failed UHF stations, since the 1970's, have pro-
vided homes for religious broadcasters and have served as
bases for Christian networks.86  One such station was
purchased as early as 1959; today it serves as the flagship for
the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN).87 Not only does
religious broadcasting offer preaching and revival, but talk,
drama, music/variety, and news magazine programs fill the reli-
gious airwaves as well. 88
In summary, the increasing commercialization of religious
broadcasting has resulted in a less than desirable situation, if,
indeed, the public airwaves are to display a true picture of the
spectrum of American religious beliefs. Instead, televangel-
ism is predominantly conservative/fundamentalist/evangelical.
This trend neither represents the more liberal, mainline tradi-
tion rooted in our country's early heritage, nor the more
diverse, smaller denominations and sects that surface due to
interest in alternative and foreign beliefs.
If it is the case that religious broadcasting represents a nar-
row band of the American religious spectrum, could it be that
the federal government is, defacto, promoting one set of beliefs
to the detriment of others? The next sections investigate this
possibility.
II.
The implicit contract between church and state has been
manifest in the FCC's treatment of religious programming.
From its early laissez-faire approach in the 1930's and 1940's to
a more accommodationist, albeit ambivalent, attitude through
the 1970's, the FCC rarely has questioned the permissibility of
religious broadcasting at all.89
In this section we discuss three issues: first, the promotion
of religious programming through the Commission's "ascer-
tainment" requirement; second, the "fairness doctrine" and its
84. Abelman & Neuendorf, The Cost of Membership in the Electronic Church,
7 RELIGIOUS COMMUNICATION TODAY 67 (1985).
85. W. FORE, supra note 80, at 83.
86. Abelman, supra note 77, at 24.
87. W. FORE, supra note 80, at 83.
88. Abelman & Neuendorf, supra note 83, at 109.
89. See supra section I, part C.
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application to religious broadcasters; and third, the current
controversy over the demise of the "fairness doctrine" as part
of the federal government's efforts to "deregulate" broadcast-
ing in general. Although there may be other regulatory topics
within the purview of the FCC, these two, ascertainment and
the "fairness doctrine," provide good examples of the Com-
mission's ambivalent attitude in its dealings with religious
broadcasters.
A. Religion Preferred.- The FCC and "Ascertainment"
Prior to deregulation, the FCC adopted a license renewal
requirement of "ascertainment"; i.e., station licensees were
required to demonstrate that their programming was serving
"the public interest."90  Various methods of substantiation
were to be used in the application process: program logs, let-
ters from listeners, etc. In any event, some form of documenta-
tion was required to demonstrate the station's fulfillment of its
mandate from the FCC. The 59-page report, Public Service
Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees,9 1 issued by the Commission in
March of 1946, was the first major effort to explain in broader
detail what was expected of stations as they "ascertained" for
the Commission how they were meeting the needs of their
broadcast area. The so-called "Blue Book" stated that
[i]n issuing and in reviewing the licenses of broadcast sta-
tions the Commission proposes to give particular consid-
eration to four program service factors relevant to the
public interest. . . . (1) the carrying of sustaining pro-
grams, including network sustaining programs . . ., (2)
the carrying of local live programs, (3) the carrying of
programs devoted to the discussion of public issues, and
(4) the elimination of advertising excesses.92
Among the programs promoted by the FCC for fulfillment of
the sustaining program factor were "nonprofit organizations-
religious, civic, agricultural, labor, educational, etc."93 The
Commission would take into consideration not only the
number of hours devoted to such programs, but also the time
of day in which they occurred. 94 Clearly, the FCC favored reli-
gion as one of the licensee's options. Not only was this a carry-
90. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
91. F.C.C., Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees (1946).
92. Id. at 55.
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Edelman, supra note 16, at 79.
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over from the FRC,9 5 but the Commission would continue to
include religious programming as part of its license
considerations .96
During his tenure as FCC Commissioner, Lee Loevinger
commented upon the use of the categories listed in the "Blue
Book" and expanded in 1960. 97 Basing his assertions on FCC
regulations,9" Loevinger noted that the Commission had uti-
lized program categories, including religion, as "prima facie
minimum requirements of acceptable programming."9 9
B. The "Fairness Doctrine".- A Threat to the Faithful?*
If, indeed, the FCC has, to some extent, promoted religion
on the public airwaves, such a claim must be balanced by an
investigation into the use of the "Fairness Doctrine,"' 00 which
specifically required the broadcaster to present opposing views
held within the station's service community.' 0 '
The "Fairness Doctrine" rarely has been applied to reli-
gious programming per se; when it has, the cases purportedly
turned upon free speech issues.'0 2 Some, however, have found
that this resulted in an uneven, hands-off policy that
encouraged the existence of religious media. 0 3 Although
95. Supra note 91, at part II, 10.
96. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
97. Loevinger, Broadcasting and Religious Liberty, 9 J. BROADCASTING, 3-23
(1965).
98. 47 USC section 307(d), in part: "...on applications for renewal of
broadcasting station licenses ... the Commission shall not require any such
applicant to file any information . . . which is not directly material to the
considerations that affect the granting or denial of such application.
(cited in Loevinger, supra note 97, at 20).
99. Loevinger, supra note 97, at 10.
100. The "Fairness Doctrine" was a further explication of the "Blue
Book" requirement to carry programs devoted to the discussion of public
issues as a step toward balanced programming. See supra note 92 and
accompanying text. The doctrine was articulated in a 1949 FCC report
entitled In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249
(1949).
101. Id. at 1249.
102. See, e.g., Red Lion v. Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969); Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 24 (D.C. Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); Pillar of Fire, 99 F.C.C.2d 1256
(1984); see generally Brooks, Televangelism and the FCC: To Regulate or Retreat, 91
DICK. L. REV. 553 (1986), and Garay, The FCC in Matters of Church and State, 9
COMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW 43 (1987).
103. L. J. Lacey has contended that the FCC gave religious
organizations unique access to the airwaves through allocation of non-
commercial educational broadcast frequencies, encouragement of religious
programming on commercial stations, and inconsistent enforcement of the
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some religious broadcasters' editorials have been highly critical
of government intervention, and of the "Fairness Doctrine"
specifically, 104 the general application of the doctrine has been
extremely tolerant of religion, perhaps to the point of eschew-
ing any hint of entanglement.t 5 The current era of broadcast
regulation is a case in point.
C. A Lack of Fairness: The Deregulatory Era
It has been argued elsewhere that the "Fairness Doctrine"
is a prime example of the "orphaned progeny" of deregula-
tion. l' That is to say that Congress and the agency in question
disagree as to whether an agency rule should remain on the
books; if the agency is thwarted by Congress in dropping such a
rule, the agency simply leaves it intact, but never enforces it. 107
Despite FCC Chairman Fowler's accession to Congress' wishes
in the mid-1980's, l'0 the current deregulatory trend allowed
the Commission to repeal the "Fairness Doctrine" on constitu-
tional grounds in August of 1987.109
Reaction to the repeal has been mixed. 0 Perhaps what is
most instructive is the reaction among religious broadcasters.
An editorial from the National Religious Broadcasters stated
the organization's view tersely: the NRB was pleased to hear of
"Fairness Doctrine" across cases. More often than not, secular stations were
more likely to lose broadcast licenses than were religious stations. Lacey, The
Electric Church: An FCC-"Established" Institution?, 31 FED. COMMUNICATIONS L.
J. 235 (1979).
104. See, e.g., Hindson, Fairness Doctrine Amounted to "Censorship, " REL.
BROADCASTING 29, Oct. 1987.
105. Contrary to the allusion to "Fairness Doctrine" considerations
made by Guy H. Brooks, the FCC investigation of Faith Center, Inc., and the
Rev. Dr. W. Eugene Scott did not entail such concerns. Instead, the case
involved whether the FCC was within its rights to request financial
information from the religious broadcasting station involved. See Brooks,
supra note 102 at 568; cf Faith Center, Inc., 69 F.C.C.2d 1123 (1978); Scott v.
Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1983).
106. Bloch, Orphaned Rules in the Administrative State: The Fairness Doctrine
and Other Orphaned Progeny of Interactive Deregulation, 76 GEO. L. J. 59 (1987).
107. Id. at 59-60.
108. Id. at 61.
109. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043 (1987).
110. For a brief discussion of the issues involved, see Hyde, FCC Action
Repealing the Fairness Doctrine: A Revolution in Broadcast Regulation, 38 SYRACUSE
L. R. 1175 (1987); for a history of the doctrine and an extended argument in
favor of its reinstatement, see Bolton, "In Stark Contravention of Its Purpose'
Federal Communications Commission Enforcement and Repeal of the Fairness Doctrine,
20J. LAW REFORM 799 (1987).
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the doctrine's demise, for it was tantamount to
"censorship."'
In short, the FCC's laissez-faire approach has encouraged
televangelists; indeed, they have profited by it. For most of this
decade, broadcast ministries have grown in size and wealth,
"able to command vast audiences-and vaster funds.12 One
well-known case points out the pitfalls of the FCC's reluctant
policy. In 1979, the FCC failed to render a publishable opinion
with regard to an alleged misappropriation of funds by PTL,
headed by Jim and Tammy Bakker."
13
This is not to imply that the FCC is reluctant to prosecute
any religious broadcaster,' but the regulatory record does
reveal a situation in which the Commission has treated such
licensees with much more reserve than would be accorded sec-
ular stations. The latter, therefore, have been unduly bur-
dened by the defacto favoritism accorded to religious media by
the FCC. This effect is two-pronged: first, religious broadcast-
ing was favored as part of ascertainment; second, it received
less scrutiny than the average broadcaster. Even with the age
of deregulation, the possibilities of excessive entanglement
between church and state would seem to dictate that the FCC
will continue to discriminate between the two types of stations,
the secular and the sacred.
III.
The nodus of actors involved in public policy questions
that swirl around religious broadcasting, of course, is not lim-
ited to the Federal Communications Commission. While the
actors are many, two other agencies, one federal, the other pro-
fessional, provide other perspectives on the role religious
media are to fill in the American polity. The first is the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), which, by its power to accord tax-
111. Hindson, supra note 104, at 29.
112. Praise the Lord and Pass the Loot, supra note 5, at 23.
113. PTL of Heritage Village Church & Missionary Fellowship, Inc., Broadcast
Action, instructing FCC staff to appraise Justice Department of investigation
involving PTL. N. 18597. Not published in the FCC Reports, by direction of
the Commission (released Dec. 8, 1982). (Commissioners Fogarty, Jones,
and Rivera dissenting). For a complete discussion of the events surrounding
the investigation, see Brooks, supra note 102, at 570-74.
114. Jonathan Turley, however, has argued that "FCC action against
televangelists remains a rarity. The FCC is hampered by its own
administrative limitations. An FCC decision not to renew a license spawns
years of costly litigation and investigation." Turley, Laying Hands on Religious
Racketeers: Applying Civil RICO to Fraudulent Religious Solicitation, 29 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 470 (1988).
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exempt status to churches and other nonprofit organizations,
holds sway over regulatory questions not necessarily within the
FCC's jurisdiction. The second is the organizational represen-
tative of approximately 1200 media groups," 5 the National
Religious Broadcasters (NRB).
A. The Reluctant Tax Man: The IRS and the Electronic "Church"
If the FCC has been somewhat friendly to religious broad-
casting, another government agency has seemed ambivalent at
best. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has allowed certain
organizations tax-exempt status when the following criteria are
met:
(1) it must be organized and operated exclusively for reli-
gious purposes;
(2) no part of its net earnings may inure to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual; and
(3) it must not engage in substantial lobbying activities or
intervene in any political campaign.' 16
Although not readily apparent, a great deal of ambiguity
exists in the Internal Revenue Code with regard to illegitimate
religious organizations, 1 7 let alone broadcast ministries. The
results are rather problematic. What constitutes a "church,"
and what it means, to have "religious purposes" have never
been defined by the IRS or the Department of the Treasury."'
Moreover, an organization that wishes to qualify as a church
with the IRS must meet an undefined portion of fourteen crite-
115. National Religious Broadcasters: United for Excellence.
116. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982).
117. See generally Casino, "I Know It When I See It".- Mail-Order Ministry
Tax Fraud and the Problem of a Constitutionally Acceptable Definition of Religion, 25
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 113 (1987).
118. Joint Committee on Taxation, Overview of Tax Rules Applicable to
Exempt Organizations Engaged in Television Ministries 2-3 (JCS-21-87), Oct. 5,
1987.
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ria;' 19 however, the United States Tax Court views the criteria
merely as guidelines, not as rules.' 2 °
The net result of these legal ambiguities is that broadcast
ministries enjoy the same tax privileges as the Catholic cathe-
dral downtown. Only the most extreme cases of religious fraud
seem to be prosecuted easily.' 2 ' But tax-exempt status is not a
guaranteed right, as has been shown in the case of religious
schools. Governmental interests may override a religious
organization's tax privileges.122 Such actions, however, have
indicated to some that tax-exempt status could be offered on an
arbitrary basis, and would thus be discriminatory. Such a
charge is not new in legal discussions. In Walz v. Tax Commis-
smon, 2 3 the Supreme Court majority found such tax exemptions
to be constitutional as a legislative grant. Justice Douglas, the
sole dissenter, found such a practice to be a form of state aid to
religion:
If history be our guide, then tax exemption of church
property in this country is indeed highly suspect, as it
arose in the early days when the church was an agency of
the state .... State aid to places of worship, whether in
119. These criteria include:
(1) a distinct legal existence;
(2) a recognized creed and form of worship;
(3) a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government;
(4) a formal code of doctrine or discipline;
(5) a distinct religious history;
(6) a membership not associated with any other church or de-
nomination;
(7) a complete organization of ordained ministers ministering to
their congregations and selected after completing prescribed
courses of study;
(8) a literature of its own;
(9) established places of worship;
(10) regular congregations;
(11) regular religious services;
(12) schools for the religious instruction of the young;
(13) schools for the preparation of its ministers; and
(14) any other facts and circumstances that may bear upon the
organization's claim to church status.
IRS Manual 7(10)69 Exempt Organizations Examination Guidelines Handbook
§ 321.3 (Apr. 5, 1982).
120. Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 118, at 3.
121. See generally Casino, supra note 113; Turley, supra note 110.
122. See, e.g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983), in which the Court found that the university had violated public
policy in its failure to eliminate racial discrimination and thereby had
forfeited its privilege of tax-exemption.
123. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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the form of direct grants or tax exemption, takes us back
to the Assessment Bill and the [Madison's] Remonstrance.
The church qua church would not be entitled to that sup-
port from believers and nonbelievers alike. Yet the
church qua nonprofit, charitable institution is one of
many that receive that form of subsidy through tax
exemption.' 24
At the present time, tax-exempt status seems in little dan-
ger of revocation. Although recent litigation has challenged
the tax-exempt status of the Catholic Church itself,'2 5 the case
never has been heard at the appellate level. The reason for this
is the availability of evidence from church financial records.
The U.S. Catholic Conference (USCC) and the National Con-
ference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) appealed a contempt
charge connected with the case. Although they were subpoe-
naed as nonparty witnesses, the Supreme Court held that the
USCC and the NCCB could question the jurisdiction of the
District Court in the underlying action. The appeal was
reversed and remanded, and the contempt charge has not been
reheard. 126 Without evidence from these Catholic organiza-
tions, the primary case can not be appealed. It seems unlikely
that another such case will arise soon to challenge Walz's hold-
ing for religious organizations in general.
Religious broadcasters, then, have benefitted greatly from
the difficulties encountered by the government in according
tax-exempt status to religious organizations. An excellent case
in point is the celebrated PTL scandal. Jim Bakker's ministry
was able to postpone serious governmental inquiry not only
from the FCC, 127 but from the IRS.' 28
If the post-scandal reaction is any indication, the IRS may
be attempting preventative measures against future abuse of
the tax laws by televangelists. In late 1988, the IRS reported
that it was auditing 26 television ministries. 29 However, one
124. Id. at 703, 707.
125. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Baker, 110 F.R.D. 337
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) aff'd sub nom. In re Catholic Conference (USCC), 824 F.2d
156 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 487 U.S. 72 (1988).
126. In re United States Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d 156 (2d Cir.
1987), rev'd, United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights
Mobilization, 487 U.S. 72 (1988).
127. Supra note 113 and accompanying text.
128. Frankl, Televangelism, supra note 82, at 129; Praise the Lord and Pass
the Loot, supra note 5, at 28.
129. New York Times, Dec. 10, 1988, at 12, col. l;Dec. 11, 1988, at45,
col. 1. The I.R.S. has since reduced the number of ministries under
investigation to 23. New York Times, Mar. 15, 1989, at 11, col. 6.
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wonders, based on the regulatory history, how willing the
agency will be to tread the line between church and state. The
religious media themselves, under the aegis of the National
Religious Broadcasters, will have something to say about it.
B. The National Religious Broadcasters and Mr. Jefferson's "Wall"
The aftermath of the PTL scandal brought about a rare
dialogue between Congress and religious broadcasters in the
form of a House subcommittee hearing.' A brief history of
the National Religious Broadcasters (NRB) in general, in addi-
tion to some excerpts from this hearing, provide some insight
with regard to attitudes toward government regulation held by
major televangelists and their representatives.
Formed in 1943, the NRB came into existence in part to
"preserve access to the nation's airwaves." ' According to a
membership fact sheet, the NRB, inter alia, "maintains rapport
with the FCC and the broadcasting industry."' 2 The NRB's
immediate reactions to the proposed hearing in 1987 tested
that "rapport."' 133 At one point, the organization was quite
vituperative in its description of Congress' intent. Reportedly,
a letter went out from NRB headquarters to its membership
without the knowledge of its Executive Director Ben Arm-
strong.'3 4 In it, the hearing was described as unreasonable,
"the beginning of a new 'inquisition' " against religious broad-
casters.'3 5 The letter called for contributions to the NRB
Defense Fund, designed to maintain the right of television min-
istries to use the airwaves. 136 Although Mr. Armstrong apolo-
gized to Chairman J. J. Pickle (D-Texas) and the
subcommittee, 137 such commentary apparently set the tone for
the televangelist witnesses.
Some broadcasters, such as Jerry Falwell and John
Ankerberg, were rather diplomatic in tone toward the subcom-
mittee.' 3 8 However, the Rev. D. James Kennedy, of Coral
130. Federal Tax Rules Applicable to Tax-Exempt Organizations, supra note 9.
131. Hostetler, National Religious Broadcasters: What If There Were No
NRB?.
132. National Religious Broadcasters: Membership Fact Sheet (no date).
133. See, e.g., Armstrong, The Hearings, Editorial, RELIGIOUS
BROADCASTING 8 (Nov. 1987).
134. Federal Tax Rules Applicable to Tax-Exempt Organizations, supra note 9,
at 273.
135. Id. at 265.
136. Id. at 266.
137. Supra note 134.
138. Id. at 76 ff.
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Ridge Ministries, opened the testimony from broadcasters with
a great deal of concern that even the hearing itself was an
investigation of churches."3 9 Although Chairman Pickle reas-
sured him that the hearing was not an investigation of
churches,140 Kennedy foresaw "a danger of the federal govern-
ment taking control over the church."'' 4 1 These and subse-
quent, more tempered statements from televangelists and from
Mr. Armstrong indicate that the NRB and its members would
prefer to keep Thomas Jefferson's "wall of separation"' 4 2 high
and impregnable, at least as far as government crossing over
into the churchyard is concerned.
In light of the reluctance of government agencies to
intrude upon church territory, the wishes expressed by these
broadcasters appear to be granted. The regulatory history of
religious broadcasting thus intimates a curious construction of
the "wall": broadcast ministries are protected by the First
Amendment from undue intrusion by government regulation;
yet the arrangement does not prohibit religious media involve-
ment in political affairs. Indeed, one aspect of the New Chris-
tian Right (though not equivalent to it) is the power accorded
conservative Christians through religious media. 143 What is
striking is that these media encourage an interpretation of the
"wall" metaphor that does not inhibit their activity. At the
same time, this interpretation seems to promote religion."1
14
139. Id. at 66-67.
140. Id. at 67.
141. Id. at 69.
142. This phrase comes from Thomas Jefferson's letter to the Danbury
Baptist Association: "I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the
whole American people which declared that the legislature should 'make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, Or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between Church and State." 8
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (H. Washington ed 1861). The phrase
first appears in Supreme Court case law in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1879), and takes on greater currency in Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1 (1947). Justice Rehnquist, in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985) (dissenting opinion), refutes the usage of the phrase through a
historical analysis.
143. See generally D. BROMLEY & A. SHUPE, NEW CHRISTIAN POLITICS
(1987); R. LIEBMAN & R. WUTHNOW, EDS, THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT:
MOBILIZATION AND LEGITIMIZATION (1983); J. HADDEN & A. SHUPE,
TELEVANGELISM, POWER, AND POLITICS ON GOD'S FRONTIER (1988).
144. See infra note 167 and accompanying text (section of prong two of
Lemon).
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IV.
We believe that the licensing and broadcasting of religious
programs on public airwaves violates the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.' 45 This
position 46 is taken in the face of a long history of religious
broadcasts on both television and radio, 4 7 and at a time when
there now appears to be something close to a perfect mar-
riage 14 between religion and the mass media.'49 Despite this
long term relationship, and notwithstanding the present day
status quo,150 we believe that the broadcasting of religious pro-
grams-from its inception-constitutes a violation of the First
Amendment. As counterintuitive as this argument seems, at
one time prayer in public schools was also a common practice
and one whose constitutional infirmities were either long over-
looked or intentionally ignored. The same can be said for the
broadcasting of religious programs on public airwaves. In fact,
145. The pertinent provisions of the First Amendment are: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; .... "
146. We cannot claim to have originated this thesis. A decade ago
LindaJo Lacey took this iconoclastic position. Lacey, supra note 103. Despite
the compelling nature of this argument, it has apparently found few
adherents, either in the church-state literature, or in policymaking or judicial
circles. The present analysis is based on the same premise, although the
effort is to extend some of Lacey's arguments and provide new ones. It
should also be noted that our ultimate conclusion is different from Lacey's, in
that we disagree with her on whether the Free Exercise Clause would be
violated by removing religious broadcasting from the public airwaves.
Despite these and other differences, we recognize our intellectual debt to her
earlier article.
147. See generally sections I-III.
148. Quentin Schultze has pointed out how many religious
denominations have viewed the advent of the mass communications as a
godsend in their effort to carry their message far and wide. Schultze, The
Mythos of the Electronic Church, 4 CRITICAL STUDIES or MASS COMMUNICATION
245 (1987).
149. The estimates of how many individuals in this country watch
religious programs, or listen to them on the radio, vary considerably. In
terms of the former, there have been projections that as many as 13.3 million
people in this country-or 62% of the national audience-watch religious
programs regularly. Ostling, Power, Glory and Politics, TIME, Feb. 17, 1986, at
62, 63.
150. Quentin Schultze estimates that there are tens of thousands of
religious broadcasts each year, and the trend seems to be an upward one. For
example, between 1985 and 1986 there was a 10% increase in religious radio
stations, and a 10076 increase in the number of religious television stations.
Schultze, The Vythos of the Electronic Church, supra note 148, at 246. But see
Frame, supra note 7, at 32 (showing the declining ratings of the major
televangelists).
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the analogy to prayer in schools and to state aid to religious
affiliated schools goes even further; some of the same princi-
ples in this area of constitutional law are applied to the present
analysis.
There are three related arguments for the position that
religious broadcasts are unconstitutional and that they should
be removed from the public airwaves. The first maintains that
the "effects" prong and the "excessive entanglement" prong of
Lemon 15' are violated by these practices, 152 thus constitutirg an
Establishment Clause violation. A second argument against
broadcasting religious programs is based on the inherent prob-
lem of government regulation in this area generally, particu-
larly where any attempts to do so would violate the Free
Exercise Clause, or be perceived as such by both church'1 3 and
state.' 54 It is conceded that thus far government has not found
it necessary to "censor" religious broadcasts. There is no
assurance, however, that this state of affairs will continue. The
hypothetical employed to make the argument for the impossi-
bility of regulating the content of religiously-based programs
involves a Satanic cult that wants to broadcast a devil's worship
ceremony on television. 55 There is no doubt that this would
be particularly gruesome material to show on the public air-
waves and it is quite understandable why the FCC would seek
to prevent its broadcast. Yet the first amendment prohibits the
government from favoring some religions over others,' 56 or, in
151. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The three part test is'as
follows: the legislative enactment must have a secular purpose, its primary
effect must be neither to advance nor inhibit religion, and it must not foster
excessive entanglement between government and religion.
152. It will be assumed that the government's purpose in approving
most broadcasting licenses is a secular one. Thus, there is no concern about
the first prong of Lemon. This ready acceptance of the government's
purpose in providing a license is sorely tested, however, when it provides one
to stations that are wholly owned by religious organizations. In these
instances one might well argue that the granting of this license serves no
secular purpose whatsoever.
153. See Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1983) (minister
investigated for fraudulent solicitation unsuccessfully argued that any
government investigation in church affairs violated the Free Exercise Clause).
154. Supra Part III-B.
155. In 1988, an episode of the "Geraldo" show focused on satanic
worship and achieved one of its highest ratings. See infra note 220.
156. In Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) the Court applied a
strict scrutiny standard to a Minnesota statute regulating charitable
contributions because the effect of the statute was to treat the Unification
Church ("Moonies") differently from other churches. The Court found that
the scheme violated the clearest command of the Establishment Clause: "one
1990]
792 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LA W, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 4
this case, allowing some forms of religious worship but pro-
scribing other forms. The conclusion drawn here is that
because the Constitution prohibits government censorship of
religious practices, all religious broadcasts should be banned
from the public airwaves.
The third and final argument involves answering the
charge that removing religious programming from the public
airwaves would violate the Free Exercise rights of preachers
who use this medium to preach and similar rights of viewers
who would wish to continue to watch these programs.
Although this is the strongest argument against the position
espoused here, the case law in this area offers little help to this
position. A government proscription of all religious broadcasts
would apply equally, and it would not test or pass judgment on
the beliefs or practices of any religion. It is recognized that
many churches and adherents would be forced to alter their
present method of "worship," but this would not rise to the
level of a constitutional violation.
A. Applying the Lemon Standard
1. The "Effects" Prong
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment reads:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion. . . ." In Everson v. Board of Education 157 the Supreme
Court held that the Establishment Clause means that "neither a
state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another."' 5 8 In a dissenting opinion in Ever-
son, Justice Rutledge wrote:
The [First] Amendment's purpose was not to strike
merely at the official establishment of a single sect, creed
or religion, outlawing only a formal relation such as had
prevailed in England and some of the colonies. Neces-
sarily it was to uproot such relationships. But the object
was broader than separating church and state in this nar-
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another." Id. at
244.
157. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Everson involved the constitutionality of a New
Jersey statute that authorized state expenditures to transport all children to
schools, including church-related schools. Although Justice Black's majority
opinion established the metaphor of a "wall of separation" between church
and state, these expenditures were found not to violate the Constitution
because they were in the nature of public welfare expenditures.
158. Id. at 15.
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row sense. It was to create a complete and permanent
separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil
authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of
public aid or support for religion.1
59
In the landmark decision of Engel v. Vitale, t6 0 which struck
down the practice of prayer in public schools, Justice Black dis-
cussed the concerns of the framers and the aims of the Estab-
lishment Clause:
When the power, prestige and financial support of gov-
ernment is placed behind a particular religious belief, the
indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to
conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is
plain. But the purposes underlying the Establishment
Clause go much further than that. Its first and most
immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of
government and religion tends to destroy government
and to degrade religion.1
6'
Since at least 1971, the Supreme Court's standard for
detecting Establishment Clause violations has been the three
prong Lemon test.
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster "an excessive government entanglement
with religion." '
6 2
Despite the common acceptance of the Lemon standard in
the Establishment Clause area, this same standard has not been
applied to religious broadcasting.' 6 3 This fact is hard to
explain.' 6 4 When the government approves a broadcast license
159. Id. at 31-32.
160. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). Engel involved the constitutionality of a
prayer prepared by the New York board of Regents that the local school
board had directed be said in class. The Court held that this violated the
Establishment Clause.
161. Id. at 431.
162. 403 U.S. at 612-613.
163. Lacey, supra note 103, at 237-47, points out how challenges to
religious broadcasting have taken the form that such programs were not
"educational," and thus not deserving of belonging on noncommercial
television. The Establishment Clause has not been a central focus of such
challenges, or the FCC's response.
164. The common acceptance of the Lemon standard should not mask
the repeated criticisms that it has been subject to, both by commentators off
the Court but also by many members of the Court as well. See Jones,
Accommodationist and Separationist Ideals in Supreme Court Decisions, 28 J. CHURCH
& STATE 183, 193 (1986) ("Not only are the tests themselves flexible enough
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it is providing a valuable' 65 public' 66 good. When the govern-
ment provides a broadcasting license based on the understand-
ing that there will be X number of hours of religious
broadcasting, this provision (and the broadcasting of religious
programs themselves) violates the second prong of the Lemon
test because this has the effect of advancing religion. As such,
there is an Establishment Clause violation. No longer is gov-
ernment neutral towards religion. Instead, the effect of pro-
moting the airing of religious broadcasts over government
regulated public airwaves advances or promotes religion gener-
ally, particularly those religions that are able to obtain air
time. 167
The counter argument to this position might run along
these lines. One could argue that the Federal Communica-
tions Commission's mandate is to regulate the public airwaves
to validate or invalidate any state action, it is also not at all clear when and
how exactly the tests are to be applied.") Id. at 213; Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402 (1985) (J. O'Connor dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (J.
Rehnquist dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (J. White
concurring and dissenting).
165. One reason why the granting of a broadcast license is so valuable
is that despite the increase in broadcast outlets, the demand for licenses still
far outweighs the supply. Minow points out that when RKO's channels were
made available for licensees, the FCC received 172 applications for the few
stations available. Moreover, when the FCC announced new power stations,
the FCC received almost 14,000 applications. Minow, Being Fair to the Fairness
Doctrine, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1985, at A23, col. 1. The Supreme Court
sustained the constitutionality of the "fairness doctrine" at least partly on the
basis of this scarcity rationale. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
at 390. But see the FCC claim in the 1985 Fairness Report, "Currently there
are a total of 54 vacant VHF channels and 462 vacant UHF channels. [O]f
these vacant allocations, 34 are commercial VHF channels and 109
commercial UHF channels. These vacancies appear in both large and small
markets." General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 50 Fed. Reg.
35,418, 35,439. For a discussion of these issues see Bolton, supra note 110, at
815-16.
166. The fact that the assistance does not come in the direct form of
money (although owning a broadcast license is generally quite lucrative) does
not matter. For example, in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) the
constitutionality of the publicly displayed nativity scene did not hinge on the
fact that the city had originally paid $1365 for the creche and that the
erection and dismantling of it cost the city of Pawtucket approximately $20
per year.
167. Although a distinction has been drawn between the licensing
procedure that promotes the broadcasting of religious programs and the
actual broadcasts themselves, the distinction is not essential to the argument
made here. That is, even if the government did not promote religious
broadcasting in determining the suitability of license applicants, the showing
of religious programs over the public airwaves would still violate both the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
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in the "public interest." 168 Moreover, the FCC has defined this
term by specifying programming characteristics essential to
meeting the public interest standard as follows:
[T]he major elements usually necessary to meet the pub-
lic interest, needs, and desires of the community ....
have included: (1) opportunity for local self-expression,
(2) the development and use of local talent, (3) programs
for children, (4) religious programs, (5) educational pro-
grams, (6) public affairs programs, (7) editorialization by
licensees, (8) political broadcasts, (9) agricultural pro-
grams, (10) news programs, (11) weather and market
reports, (12) sports programs, (13) service to minority
groups, (14) entertainment programming.
169
There is no doubt that, by some, perhaps most, standards,
religious broadcasts are in the public interest. The same argu-
ment has been made, repeatedly in fact, for a whole host of
schemes that have been found to violate the Establishment
Clause. For example, it has often been argued that prayer in
public schools is in the public interest because it fosters a belief
in a Supreme Being; 170 the same could be said for state
financed salary supplements for teachers in religious affiliated
schools, 17 1 and so on. 1 72 "Public interest," however, is not
enough. When the government provides benefits it is bound
by the strictures of the Establishment Clause. When the gov-
ernment provides a license to a broadcaster with the under-
standing that the broadcaster is to provide a certain amount of
air time to religious programming, 73 the government is
168. The phrase used throughout the Federal Communications Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 1064, June 19, 1934 (current version at 47 U.S.C. Secs. 151-
609 (1976)) is "if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served,"
usually in reference to the granting of a broadcast license.
169. Federal Communications Commission, Report and Statement of Policy
re: Commission en banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (July 29, 1960)
(emphasis supplied).
170. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (striking down the reading
in school of a prayer prepared by government officials); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (striking down the practice of reading
the Bible in public schools).
171. This practice was declared unconstitutional in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
172. In fact, the "public interest" standard could be read to be
synonymous with the "secular purpose" prong of the Lemon test.
173. One of the distinctions made (at times) in the area of state aid to
religious affiliated schools is whether these schools were the direct
beneficiaries of assistance or not. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399
(1983) ("We also agree that, by channeling whatever assistance [a state
income tax deduction] it may provide to parochial schools through individual
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thereby providing a benefit to religion that is constitutionally
impermissible. Moreover, the First Amendment is especially
violated when the government provides a broadcasting license
to a religious organization itself, thereby allowing this group to
decide which programs are to be shown on the public
airwaves. 
7 4
But it is not only the agreement between church and state
to broadcast religious programs that is constitutionally infirm.
The broadcasting of such programs are themselves constitu-
tional violations. This position is made clearer if one adopts
Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" view of the Establishment
Clause. As she writes in her concurring opinion in Lynch v.
Donnelly 175:
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove
of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective
of government's actual purpose, the practice under
review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or dis-
approval. An affirmative answer to either question
should render the challenged practice invalid. 1
76
Later in the course of her opinion Justice O'Connor continues
her explanation of this endorsement standard.
What is crucial is that a government practice not have the
effect of communicating a message of government
endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only prac-
tices having that effect, whether intentionally or uninten-
parents, Minnesota has reduced the Establishment Clause objections to
which its action is subject.") When a broadcast license is provided to one
who agrees to provide religious broadcasting, it might be asserted that
religion benefits only indirectly, and thus such assistance from the
government is constitutionally permissible. This is not a strong argument,
and in any event one that cannot be relied on when the FCC provides a
license to a religious organization.
174. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) provides a
somewhat analogous situation. In Larkin the Court struck down a
Massachusetts statute which gave churches and schools the power to veto the
issuance of liquor licenses to applicants located within a five hundred foot
radius of these churches and schools. A unanimous Supreme Court struck
down this law because it conferred government power to a religious
organization. In terms of broadcasting, although the government certainly
does not dictate what programs a licensee must show, still, when it provides a
license to a religious organization the government is allowing this group to
decide what will appear on that public airwave.
175. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
176. Id. at 690.
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tionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or public
perception, to status in the public community.
1 7 7
Justice O'Connor then examined the public supported creche
that was being challenged in Lynch, and she concluded that
despite the religious trappings, "[t]he display celebrates a pub-
lic holiday, and no one contends that declaration of that holi-
day is understood to be an endorsement of religion."'
' 71
Even if one accepts Justice O'Connor's conclusion that the
creche in question did not constitute an endorsement of reli-
gion, 17  still, contrast the example of a publicly supported
creche during the Christmas season with a situation of govern-
ment support for radio and television programs-all year
round-that are unmistakably religious in tone and nature.1
8 0
It is readily conceded that the FCC does not "endorse"
religious programming in a literal sense, but it certainly does
177. Id. at 692.
178. Id.
179. A dissenting opinion written by Justice Brennan, and joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, rejects the idea that the creche's
presence on public lands would not constitute an endorsement of the
religious tenets behind it.
The "primary effect" of including a nativity scene in the city's
display is, as the District Court found, to place the government's
imprimatur of approval on the particular religious beliefs
exemplified by the creche. Those who believe in the message of the
nativity receive the unique and exclusive benefit of public
recognition of their views. . . . The effect on minority religious
groups, as well as on those who may reject all religion, is to convey
the message that their views are not similarly worthy of public
recognition nor entitled to public support.
Id. at 701.
180. It will be argued that the public generally is unaware of how the
FCC licensing regulations operate-in fact perhaps few have ever heard of
the FCC-and thus there can be no real government "endorsement" as such.
AlthoughJustice O'Connor seems to give a literal reading of "endorsement,"
this approach is too narrow. For example, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) the Court found "state action" for purposes
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where a
privately owned coffee shop housed within a building owned by the
Wilmington Parking Authority refused to serve blacks. The point here is that
even if no one knew that the parking garage was owned by the state, this still
would have constituted "state action." As the Court explained:
By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not only
made itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place
its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination.
The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with [the coffee shop] that it must be recognized as
a joint participant in the challenged activity ....
Id. at 725.
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so implicitly, both by its licensing practices and by allowing
religious programs to be transmitted over the public airwaves.
In essence, the government regulates the medium that brings
the viewing public tens of thousands of religious programs
each year. Is this not the endorsement and advancement of
religion?
The broadcasting of religious programs violates not only
the Establishment Clause, it violates the Free Exercise Clause
as well. To understand this it is necessary to examine the
nature of broadcasting itself. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,'8 '
the Supreme Court upheld the power of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission to restrict "indecent" programs from the
public airwaves. In rejecting the licensee's First Amendment
challenge the Court held:
We have long recognized that each medium of expres-
sion presents special First Amendment problems ...
And of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting
that has received the most limited First Amendment
protection. i82
The Court then gave two rationales for why "free speech" is
more restricted in the broadcasting context.
First, the broadcast media have established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans. Patently
offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves
confronts the citizen, not only in public but also in the
privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be
left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights
of an intruder .... Because the broadcast audience is con-
stantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot com-
pletely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected
program content.
83
In addition, the Court noted the suspectibility of the viewing
audience.
Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to chil-
dren, even those too young to read .... Pacifica's broad-
cast could have enlarged a child's vocabulary in an
instant. Other forms of offensive expression may be
withheld from the young without restricting the expres-
sion at its source .... We held in Ginsberg v. New York
that the government's interest in the "well-being of its
181. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
182. Id. at 748.
183. Id.
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youth" and in supporting "parents' claim.to authority in
their own household" justified the regulation of other-
wise protected expression. The ease with which children
may obtain access to broadcast material, coupled with the
concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special
treatment of indecent broadcasting."4
In sum, what the Court recognized in Pacifica was that
broadcasters enjoyed fewer First Amendment rights because of
the pervasiveness of the medium; the fact that these messages
were received in the privacy of one's home, where individuals
should not have to be faced and/or confronted with the free
market of ideas;' 8 5 and finally, the unique accessibility of these
public broadcasts to impressionable young people.
86
Apply the principles enunciated in Pacifica to the phenome-
non of religious broadcasting. Consider first the interests or
rights of non-believers or those who find "public" worship to
be offensive. In his concurring opinion in Abington School District
v. Schempp 187 Justice Brennan addressed these concerns:
There are persons in every community-often deeply
devout-to whom any version of the Judeo-Christian
Bible is offensive. There are others whose reverence for
the Holy Scriptures demands private study or reflection
and to whom public reading or recitation is sacrilegious,
as one of the expert witnesses at the trial of the Schempp
Case explained. To such persons it is not the fact of
using the Bible in public schools, nor the content of any
particular version, that is offensive, but only the manner in
184. Id. at 749.
185. The Court reaffirmed this principle in Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct.
2495 (1988) where the Court upheld an ordinance that completely banned
picketing "before or about" any residence. The Court held:
Although in many locations, we expect individuals simply to avoid
speech they do not want to hear, the home is different .... [A]
special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls,
which the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid
intrusions. Thus, we have repeatedly held that individuals are not
required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and
that the government may protect this freedom.
Id. at 2502 (citations omitted).
•186. Young people might not be the only ones who are quite
impressionable. Studies have shown that viewers of televangelist programs
tend to be older, have less education, and earn lower average salaries than
viewers of non-religious television. See Note, Televangelism and the Federal
Communications Commission: To Regulate or Retreat, DICK. L. REv. 553, 555
(1986) (providing the results of a study commissioned by the National
Council of Churches).
187. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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which it is used. For such persons, the anathema of pub-
lic communion is even more pronounced when prayer is
involved. Many deeply devout persons have always
regarded prayer as a necessarily private experience.' 8
Religious broadcasts do not respect the fact that some individu-
als will find such programs to be highly offensive and contrary
to their religious teachings and beliefs. Moreover, as the Court
held in Pacifica, the countervailing argument that those who are
offended can simply turn the channel or change the dial is not a
strong one. Pacifica held instead that individuals who are in the
privacy of their own home should not have to continually turn
away from messages over the public airwaves that they would
find offensive.' 8 9 The broadcasting of religious programs,
however, confronts those who do not want to hear religious
messages. As such, it violates the Free Exercise rights of those
to whom such public displays of worship would be anathema to
their religious beliefs.
A different kind of Free Exercise Clause violation occurs
when religious messages over the public airwaves interfere with
the ability of parents of raise their children with certain reli-
gious beliefs and creeds. The Court has unequivocally recog-
nized parental autonomy in this vital area.' 90 Yet, religious
broadcasts might offer a version of religion that competes with
the one that some parents are attempting to offer to their off-
spring. Moreover, children-perhaps even the parents-may
not even be aware of the fact that they are being indoctri-
nated.' 9 ' In a concurring opinion in Pacifica, Justice Powell
wrote:
188. Id. at 283-84.
189. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell explained the differences
at more length.
[B]roadcasting-unlike most other forms of communication-comes
directly into the home, the one place where people ordinarily have
the right not to be assaulted by uninvited and offensive sights and
sounds. Although the First Amendment may require unwilling
adults to absorb the first blow of offensive but protected speech
when they are in public before they turn away, a different order of
values obtains in the home.
438 U.S. at 759 (citations omitted).
190. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
191. In the context of state aid to religious affiliated schools, the Court
has held that students in these schools might not even be mindful that they
are being religiously indoctrinated. For example, in Grand Rapids School
District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) the Court held:
When conducting a supposedly secular class in the pervasively
sectarian environment of a religious school, a teacher may
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The Commission properly held that the speech from
which society may attempt to shield its children is not
limited to that which appeals to the youthful prurient
interest. The language involved in this case is as poten-
tially degrading and harmful to children as representa-
tions of many erotic acts. 9 2
Much the same could be said for religious broadcasting as
well. Parents who wish to have their children imbibe certain
religious beliefs-and only certain religious beliefs-will often
find that their efforts are in direct competition with the reli-
gious messages of those on the public airwaves. 9 3 While
mature adults might not be strongly affected by television's
ministers,' 9 4 there is far less certainty of this with children,
given their impressionablity,' 9 5 as well as the unique accessibil-
ity that they have to this media.' 9 6 What adds to the serious-
ness of this threat is the fact that what is at issue-religious
beliefs and values-goes to the very core of a person's being.
One would not be denigrating the Court's concern in Pacifica
by pointing out the obvious: that conflicting and perhaps
frightening religious messages received over the airwaves
knowingly or unwillingly tailor the content of the course to fit the
school's announced goals. If so, there is no reason to believe that
this kind of ideological influence would be detected or reported by
students....
Id. at 3225-26.
192. 438 U.S. at 758.
193. The Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) not only
sought to protect the general authority of parents to direct the religious
upbringing of their children, but it also recognized that outside influences
could pose a direct threat to these efforts. In Yoder, the Court refused to
enforce Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance requirement as it applied
to adolescent Amish children, holding that forcing these children to go to
public school beyond the period that the parents wished posed "a very real
threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they
exist today; they must either abandon belief and be assimilated into society at
large, or be forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant society." Id.
at 218.
194. Given the enormous amounts of money that are given to the
television evangelists-even in the face of ever-widening scandals--one must
wonder. See supra notes 149 & 150 and accompanying text.
195. Teitel explains the impressionability argument this way:
Children . . . may be unable to distinguish between government
sponsorship and neutrality. Due to their inexperience and
impressionability, it is difficult for them to differentiate government
aid for a secular purpose from aid for a religious purpose.
Teitel, The Supreme Court's 1984-85 Church-State Decisions: Judicial Paths of Least
Resistance, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 651, 678 (1986).
196. Supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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might be far more detrimental to a young person than would
"indecent" language.
Parents who desire to have their children watch television's
ministers would not necessarily be prevented from doing so.
Religious broadcasters always have the option of producing
their programs on videocassettes' 97 for viewers to rent/buy
and watch in the privacy of their own homes. The difference
between this situation and what exists at the present time
should be obvious. No longer would the unsuspecting (and,
perhaps, unwilling) public at large be subjected to the tirades,
sermons, messages, and pleas for money from televangelists as
they are now.
2. Excessive Entanglement
The licensing and broadcasting of religious programs also
violates the third prong of Lemon-the excessive entanglement
standard. There are two types of the excessive entanglement.
One is "administrative" excessive entanglement that seeks to
maintain an independence between church and state by avoid-
ing a close and continuing relationship between these two
spheres.' With the advent of television and radio, what has
occurred is that church and state have been thrown together
into a much closer relationship than ever before. Religious
organizations now almost see it as some kind of right that they
possess to participate in the making of FCC policy.' 99 More-
197. While cable television differs to some extent from public
broadcasting, the similarities are far more pronounced. For an excellent
examination of these issues see Wardle, Cable Comes of Age: A Constitutional
Analysis of the Regulation of "Indecent" Cable Television Programming, 63 DEN.
U.L.R. 621 (1986).
198. The "administrative" excessive entanglement test has often
served as a death-knell for many state efforts to provide aid to religious
affiliated schools. In order to ensure that the state money is not being used
by these "pervasively sectarian" schools for religious purposes, close
supervision of these expenditures and the purposes to which they are put to
is necessary. However, this close supervision serves as a Catch-22 of sorts
because in closely supervising these schools the state would also become
"excessively entangled" with the church. Justice White has called this the
"insoluble paradox." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 668.
199. See Chopko and Grincewich, Church Participation in Federal
Communications Commission Licensing and Administration, 31 CATn. LAw. 241
(1987). The authors write:
The Bishops, individually and collectively, have important voices in
contemporary society, speaking publicly on economic, social and
family issues. Hopeful that their voices will be heard even more
clearly and effectively in the future, the Bishops have a stake in the
operations of regulated broadcast media. This concern must be
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over, the only thing that has prevented this relationship from
being that much tighter and stronger has been the fact that
televised ministries have staunchly opposed government regu-
lation on first amendment grounds, and the fact that the gov-
ernment has wholeheartedly accepted this argument.200 What
this in turn has caused, however, are the excesses which we are
beginning only now to address.
The second strand of the excessive entanglement test is a
"political" divisiveness standard. Chief Justice Burger, the
framer of this part of the Lemon test, described the constitu-
tional concern:
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigor-
ous or even partisan, are normal and healthy manifesta-
tions or our democratic system of government, but
political division along religious lines was one of the
principal evils against which the First Amendment was
intended to protect. . . . The potential divisiveness of
such conflict is a threat to the normal political pro-
cess. . . . The history of many countries attests to the
hazards of religion's intruding into the political arena or
of political power intruding into the legitimate and free
exercise of religious beliefs.2"
What has happened since religious broadcasts have
become so dominant over the public airwaves? The line
between church and state has become increasingly blurred,2 2
and religion has become far more politicized, and vice versa. 20 3 .
This is not a healthy development, either for politics or for reli-
reflected on two levels: on the national level, by influencing the
regulatory framework to ensure that the public interest is served;
and on the local level, by taking advantage of rights within that
framework to monitor and participate -in renewals and initial
licensing of television and radio facilities.
Id. at 259.
Hardy and Secrest defend aggressive religious broadcasts this way: "most
religious broadcasters cannot and will not be muzzled in their exercise of
their religious freedom to discuss issues and the answers found in their
faith." Hardy and Secrest, Religious Freedom and the Federal Communications Com-
mission, 16 VAL. U.L. REV. 57, 67 (1981). Seegenerally, Federal Tax Rules Applica-
ble to Tax-Exempt Organizations, supra note 9.
200. See generally, supra Part III-B.
201. 403 U.S. at 622-23.
202. For example, in 1988 two ministers-Pat Robertson and Jesse
Jackson-made serious bids to be elected President of the United States.
203. Peggy Shriver has pointed out that:
Among heavy viewers of religious television, 75 percent had voted in
the 1980 election. Citizens to whom religion is very important are
more involved in their communities, attend more meetings, vote
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gion. Under the guise of protecting the United States from
becoming a godless country, we have become instead a nation
where God and religion permeate most aspects of public life.
With religious broadcasting, now, God and religion threaten to
permeate our private lives as well.
3. The Bowen Decision
In 1988 the Court issued one of its more accommodation-
ist decisions in the Establishment Clause area in Bowen v. Ken-
drick.2 °4 The question the Court faced in Bowen was whether a
federal grant program 20 5 that provided pregnancy and sexual-
ity counseling and services to adolescents was unconstitutional
because the program provided for the involvement of religious
organizations in the federally funded programs.2 °6 In an opin-
ion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court upheld the law on its
face, relying essentially on three arguments. The first was that
the services provided-counseling and advising-were not reli-
gious in character. In addition, the Court relied quite strongly
on the argument that the institutions that were receiving fed-
eral money were not "pervasively sectarian. ' '20 7  Finally,
more, and belong to more civic groups than those who are not very
committed religiously.
Shriver, Religion's Very Public Presence, 480 AM. ACAD. OF POL. & Soc. ScI. 142,
148 (1985). See also WALD, RELIGION & POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1987).
204. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
205. Adolescent Family Life Act, Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 578, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300z et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III).
206. Section 300z-2 provides that demonstration projects funded by
the government:
shall use such methods as will strengthen the capacity of families to
deal with the sexual behavior, pregnancy, or parenthood of
adolescents and to make use of support systems such as other family
members, friends, religious and charitable organizations, and
voluntary organizations.
207. 108 S. Ct. at 2575-76. The Court noted that this concept
originated in the numerous cases involving state efforts to provide assistance
to parochial schools. However, the Court also seemed to imply that only such
institutions would be considered as such. Justice Blackmun in dissent
responds to this suggestion in two ways. He maintains that the institutions
receiving federal money under this federal program were much closer to
being "pervasively sectarian" than Justice Rehnquist would admit. Second,
Justice Blackmun argues that this finding is not dispositive of the issue
because, "the Court never has treated the absence of such a finding as a
license to disregard the potential for impermissible fostering of religion." Id.
at 2587. For a critique of the "pervasively sectarian" standard see generally
Gibney, State Aid to Religious-Affiliated Schools: A Political Analysis, 28 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 119 (1986).
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because these religious organizations were not pervasively sec-
tarian 20 in nature, the Court held that there would be less
need for government monitoring to ensure that recipients of
federal money were not using the funds to advance religion.2" 9
From this, the Court reasoned there would be less danger of
excessive entanglement between church and state.210
What are the implications of Bowen to the argument made
here? Bowen could be read in a very liberal fashion, and as an
indication that the Supreme Court will take a much broader
view of church-state relations. Not only is federal money going
to religious organizations to perform services where religious
doctrines might be advanced, 21 ' but, as Justice Blackmun noted
in dissent, the targeted audience is composed of young adults
where the "Court's insistence on adequate safeguards has
always been greatest. '2 1 2 Despite the similarities between the
Court's decision in Bowen and the present discussion, however,
there are at least two distinguishing features that would dictate
an opposite result. The most basic difference is that the recipi-
ents of AFLA money were not to advance religion during the
course of their work that was being funded with federal
money. 2 1  In contrast, religious broadcasters readily admit
that they are using the airwaves to pursue and promote "God's
208. In a concurring opinion, the newest member of the Court, Justice
Kennedy, took the position that even if an institution was in fact "pervasively
sectarian," this would not necessarily be dispositive of the issue. 108 S. Ct. at
2582. The implications of this position are unclear, although it would seem
to indicate that in Justice Kennedy's eyes many of the school-aid cases have
been wrongly decided.
209. Id. at 2577.
210. Id. at 2577-78.
211. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun pointed out that the
record developed by the District Court showed a number of instances where
employees of religious organizations had engaged in advancing religion
during the course of their counseling activities. Id. at 2590 n.9. In her
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor maintained that the record of the
lower court is less clear, but that even the majority opinion noted that "there
is no dispute that the record contains evidence of specific incidents of
impermissible behavior by AFLA grantees." Id. at 2581.
212. Id. at 2589.
213. Chief Justice Rehnquist writes:
[N]othing in our prior cases warrants the presumption . . . that
religiously affiliated AFLA grantees are not capable of carrying out
their functions . . . in a lawful, secular manner. Only in the context
of aid to "pervasively sectarian" institutions have we invalidated an
aid program on the grounds that there was a "substantial". risk that
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work." A second point is that even if Bowen signals that the
Court is now going to make a radical departure from its previ-
ous decisions and be primarily-perhaps solely-concerned
with the distinction between pervasively sectarian institutions
and those that are not,2 1 4 still, it is clear that religious organiza-
tions that have their own broadcast licenses would certainly be
considered pervasively sectarian institutions.
B. The Problems Inherent in Government Regulation
The second argument against the broadcasting of religious
programming involves the inherent difficulty of regulating the
content of such programs.2 15 There have been a few isolated
instances where the FCC has denied or revoked the license of
those broadcasting religious programs. These cases, however,
have not directly involved censorship of religious worship itself
or the religious message sought to be conveyed.2 t6 Moreover,
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects
against any form of religious censorship in terms of the content
of the speech. Rather than using this as a rationale for
decreased government regulation in this area, the better course
would be to remove all religious broadcasts from the public air-
waves. Otherwise, government will eventually find itself in the
impossible (and unconstitutional) position of approving certain
religious messages or broadcasts on the public airwaves and
proscribing others.
In support of this argument consider the following per-
haps not so hypothetical situation. A group that worships
Satan wants to purchase some broadcasting time (perhaps even
214. Justice Rehnquist is not clear on this point, but his opinion seems
to suggest that this distinction is paramount in determining whether the
expenditure of state money advances religion or not. However, this certainly
cannot be the case, otherwise this would allow all sorts of state money and
benefits to go to religious organizations which were not somehow
"pervasively sectarian." This would turn the Establishment Clause on its
head.
215. Turley has suggested that government oversight and investigation
of religious solicitation over the public airwaves has been virtually non-
existent, despite the billions of dollars involved, and despite the frequent
charges of fraud. Turley, supra note 114, at 447-48.
216. Thus, cases such as Young People's Association for the
Propagation of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938) (FCC determined that
programming proposed by applicant was too narrow and tended toward
religious propaganda); United Telephone Co. Inc., 55 F.C.C. 415 (1975)
(broadcaster's religious programs were "deceptive, misleading, and tainted
with criminal activity"); Scott v. Rosenberg, supra note 105, and Brandywine,
supra note 102, are not a form of religious censorship.
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obtain an FCC broadcast license) in order to show a devil wor-
ship ceremony.217 In essence they want to do the "devil's
work," and they want to reach as large an audience as possible,
much like their televangelist brothers. The ceremony that this
group is going to show over the public airwaves, the FCC has
been warned, will include the slaughter of several young ani-
mals, and the blood from these carcasses will be smeared over
the bodies of the worshippers who will be gyrating and chant-
ing their love of the devil and the fine work that he has brought
to earth-the holocaust, Pol Pot, AIDS, and the like.
Would the FCC allow this to be broadcast over the public
airwaves? It is suggested that the FCC and/or the local licen-
see would undoubtedly interpret the "public interest ' 2 1 8 stan-
dard to preclude this kind of ceremony from being broadcast.
Yet the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government censorship,
particularly if the FCC would, at the same time, allow other
forms of religious programming and worship to remain on the
public airwaves. This is by no means to countenance this kind
of religious ceremony; the same arguments employed earlier
21 9
to remove "normal" kinds of religious programming would
particularly apply in this context. In fact, these kinds of pro-
grams might well be quite attractive to the young and impres-
sionable, but they would also have a devastating effect on those
sectors of the population. 220 Again, however, the First Amend-
ment prohibits the government from favoring one form of reli-
gious worship over another. 22' Thus far the FCC has
apparently not yet been put in the position of censoring the
content of religious programming, but that date might not be
far away, and in any event the government should not place
itself in the position where it would have to make those kinds of
determinations.
C. Religious Broadcasting and the Free Exercise Clause
The final constitutional issue to address is whether the
proposal to remove religious broadcasting from the public air-
waves would violate the Free Exercise rights of televangelists
217. Lacey has pointed out the obstacles facing atheist groups
attempting to obtain air time, either under the "fairness doctrine," In re
"Fairness Doctrine" Request, Madalyn Murray, 40 F.C.C. 647 (1965), Lacey,
supra note 103, at 253, or simply to buy air time, id. at 260 n.12.
218. Supra note 169 and accompanying text.
219. Supra notes 190-197 and accompanying text.
220. See Sharbutt, Cauldron Boils Over Geraldo's 'Devil Worship', L.A.
Times, Oct. 27, 1988, Sec. VI, p. 1.
221. See supra note 158.
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and viewers of these programs. To begin this analysis, it is nec-
essary to point out that if the public airwaves were not so satu-
rated with religious broadcasts as they are, or if these
broadcasts were not so dominated by Judeo-Christian
messages, this proposal would not seem so radical in form. In
fact, if there had been a history with no religious broadcasting
on the public airwaves it is likely that efforts to initiate such
broadcasting would seem as disconcerting as the proposal
being suggested here. This, however, is not the world we live
in, nor does it begin to describe the longstanding relationship
between church and state, particularly in the area of public
broadcasting. As a result, the proposed removal of religious
broadcasts now after they have achieved a place of near perma-
nence on the public airwaves will be viewed as disestablishment
with a vengeance, perhaps even outright hostility to religion.222
The same kind of argument was made regarding the Supreme
Court's decision to prohibit prayer in the public schools. At
times the Court has refused to recognize what would otherwise
be obvious First Amendment violations because of tradition
223
or the history of a certain practice. 224 In the present situation,
neither the longstanding historical relationship between reli-
gion and the mass media nor the apparent popularity of reli-
222. Justice Brennan made similar remarks concerning the nativity
scene in question in Lynch:
I am convinced that this case appears hard not because the
principles of decision are obscure, but because the Christmas
holiday seems so familiar and agreeable. Although the Court's
reluctance to disturb a community's chosen method of celebrating
such an agreeable holiday is understandable, that cannot justify the
Court's departure from controlling precedent.
465 U.S. at 696-97.
223. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (Nebraska state
legislature's practice of opening each session with prayer did not violate
Establishment Clause because of its unique history); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961) (although state's Sunday closing laws were originally
motivated by religious forces, with passage of time religious significance has
abated); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (religious icons merely a
part of Christmas celebration tradition).
224. One critic of this position writes:
When the Court relied on tradition to uphold the Lynch nativity
scene and the legislative chaplaincy in Marsh, it essentially decreed
that minority religions must accommodate majoritarian religious
practices which have become part of, and legitimated by, American
culture. The mere passage of time thus acts as a statute of
limitations; a practice that continues long enough becomes a
tradition, insulated from later establishment challenge.
Teitel, supra note 195, at 655-56 (1986).
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gious broadcasting should serve to perpetuate these
unconstitutional practices.
The purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is to allow indi-
viduals to pursue their own religious beliefs and to practice
their religion as they see fit, without facing interference from
the government. 22 5 This does not mean, however, that the
government necessarily has to pursue policies to enhance the
ability of individuals to practice their religious beliefs. As the
Court held in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 226 "while the Free
Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny
the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a
majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its
beliefs."
2 2 7
Lacey 22s has suggested that the current approach to free
exercise of religion questions entails a two part balancing pro-
cess where the Court weighs the strength of the individual's
free exercise rights against the state's interest in restricting
those rights. "First, the Court will ask whether a regulation
places a substantial burden on a religious belief, second it will
ask whether the regulation is justified by an overriding or com-
pelling government interest.
22 9
Applying these competing interests to the proposal to
remove religious broadcasting from the public airwaves, it
becomes clear that there would be no Free Exercise Clause vio-
lations. To begin, religious beliefs-and practices for that mat-
ter-are not in question. That is, the government is not
dictating to televangelists and adherents, either implicitly or
explicitly, what their religious beliefs should be.23° Preachers
can still preach and believers can still believe as they have for
225. The most eloquent description came from Justice Jackson in
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) a case involving a Free
Exercise challenge to a coerced flag salute ceremony brought by a group of
Jehovah Witnesses. "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." Id. at 642.
226. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
227. Id. at 226.
228. Lacey, The Struggle Over Deregulation of Religiously-Affiliated
Institutions: A Classic Internal First Amendment Conflict, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 615
(1984).
229. Id. at 633.
230. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denying
unemployment compensation benefits to one who refused to work on
Saturday, her Sabbath, would constitute a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause); Accord Thomas v. Review Bd. Indiana Employment Security Div.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981). But see Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S.
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centuries. It is readily recognized that televangelists and view-
ers of religious programs will undoubtedly be inconvenienced
(and outraged23 ) if the proposal suggested here were ever
enacted. Still, it is not the government's role simply to make
religious worship as easy and as convenient as possible. This
principle was decidedly underscored in 1988 in Lyng v. North-
west Indian Cemetery Protective Association 232 where the Court
rejected the Free Exercise objections of Yurok, Karok and
Tolowa Indians to a road that was to be built by the U.S. Forest
Service in an area considered sacred by these tribes. In writing
for the Court, Justice O'Connor pointed to the limits of the
Free Exercise Clause:
It is true that this Court has repeatedly held that indirect
coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not
just outright prohibitions, are subject to scrutiny under
the First Amendment. . . . This does not and cannot
imply that incidental effects of governmental programs,
which may make it more difficult to practice certain reli-
gions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals
into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require gov-
ernment to bring forward a compelling justification for
its otherwise lawful actions. The crucial word in the con-
stitutional text is "prohibit.
23
The second concern to be balanced in the Free Exercise
area is the government's interest in pursuing the policies that it
has. Here-as in the school prayer cases-the government's
interest is a "compelling" one: it acts to avoid violating the
Constitution. In sum, the removal of religious broadcasting
would not constitute a Free Exercise Clause violation for either
the televangelist ministers or for viewers and/or listeners of
such programs. Religious beliefs are not in issue, thus there is
no action on the part of the government that is arguably trying
to change one's religious beliefs. In terms of the government's
interest, the removal of religious broadcasting should not be
taken on the basis of administrative convenience 234 or good
574 (1983) (Court upheld IRS's denial of tax-exempt status for two private
schools which racially discriminated on the basis of religious beliefs).
231. Hardy and Secrest, supra note 199 at 58, point out how a 1974
effort to "freeze" religious institutions' requests for television or FM
channels brought forth over 11 million letters to the FCC expressing a fear of
removing religious broadcasting from public airwaves.
232. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
233. Id. at 450-51 (citations omitted).
234. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (refusing to make an
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public policy. 23 5 Instead, the government should do so to
avoid violations of both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
The removal of religious broadcasts from the public air-
waves would change the nature of religion as we know it in
American society. Some might find it more difficult to practice
their religion (although others ultimately might find the oppo-
site to be true).236 Others would have the soothing comfort
237
of today's religious programs removed from the immediate
reach of the dial. As noted earlier, however, this does not
mean that religious programs would necessarily disappear from
our television screens. Televangelists could still reach their
audience by providing videocassettes of their religious sermons
and messages. Adherents thereby still could see religious pro-
grams on their television screens and in the privacy of their
own homes. What would change-and should change-is that
individuals who simply do not want to hear these messages or
else find them offensive or contrary to their religious beliefs
would no longer be subjected to them.
V.
This final section moves away from a constitutional analy-
sis, and focuses instead on how religious broadcasting has per-
verted religion and our religious way of life, all in the name of
promoting it. Neil Postman, one of the leading critics of the
mass media writes:
Though it may be un-American to say it, not every-
thing is televisible. Or to put it more precisely, what is
televised is transformed from what it was to something
else, which may or may not preserve its former essence.
For the most part, television preachers have not seriously
addressed this matter. They have assumed that what had
formerly been done in a church or a tent, and face-to-
exception of collecting Social Security tax despite Free Exercise objections of
Amish employer).
235. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (military policy
would not allow orthodoxJew to wear yarmulke, despite Free Exercise Clause
objections).
236. The school prayer cases-Engel v. Vitale and Abington School
District v. Schempp-offer similar examples. In both cases it was argued that
removing prayer and Bible reading from school would violate the Free
Exercise rights of children who desired to do so. This argument, however,
was not strong enough to withstand the fact that such practices violated the
Establishment Clause.
237. See infra section V.
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face, can be done on television without loss of meaning,
without changing the quality of the religious experience.
Perhaps their failure to address the translation issue has
its origin in the hubris engendered by the dazzling
number of people to whom television gives them
access. 238
The inattention to the changing message is not just the fault of
the media preachers, however. The recipients of the message
apparently also like this new approach to religion. For one
thing it makes far less demands on the individual: one can
"experience" religion in the privacy of one's home without
ever having actually to attend religious services. In addition,
this form of religion is seemingly far more palatable than reli-
gion used to be, or than it should be. Postman writes:
There is no great religious leader-from the Buddha to
Moses to Jesus to Mohammed to Luther-who offered
people what they want. Only what they need. But televi-
sion is not well suited to offering people what they need.
It is "user friendly." It is too easy to turn off. It is at its
most alluring when it speaks the language of dynamic vis-
ual imagery. It does not accommodate complex language
or stringent demands. As a consequence, what is
preached on television is not anything like the Sermon on
the Mount. Religious programs are filled with good
cheer. They celebrate affluence. Their featured players
become celebrities. Though their messages are trivial,
the shows have high ratings, or rather, because their
messages are trivial, the shows have high ratings.23 9
William Fore has similarly suggested that the marriage
between the mass media and religion has undoubtedly bastard-
ized and perverted the latter.24 ° However, Fore also holds out
hope that the mass media can play some role in advancing reli-
gious thought and practice in this country. This is a very high
hope, and one that contradicts all available evidence of what
the relationship between religion and the mass media has been.
The current climate of deregulation in mass communication
public policy merely exacerbates the problems discussed in this
essay. Sectarian organizations have received broadcast licenses
at a rate unthought of by government officials in the early days
238. N. POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN
THE AGE OF SHOW BUSINESS 118 (1985).
239. Id. at 121.
240. See generally, W. FORE, supra note 80.
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of radio regulation.2 4' Not only does the government allow
sectarian programming, but sectarian stations. Such a policy
might be permissible if all organizations are treated the same.
But the current complexion of religious broadcasting indi-
cates otherwise. Despite an "open marketplace" approach to
the public airwaves, the result has been a de facto support of
Judeo-Christian belief, predominantly conservative and Protes-
tant. Herein lies a paradox. If government intervenes to rec-
tify the situation, it moves beyond the proscribed limits set by
the Establishment Clause as interpreted under Lemon. But only
to accommodate religion to the degree suggested by Lyng per-
petuates a type of religious discrimination that is constitution-
ally undesirable. In short, all religious beliefs are equal in
America, but some beliefs are more equal than others when
placed on television.
To some extent, the regulation of religion in general has
become a Hobson's choice due to the casuistry to which the
religion clauses have been subjected in the last fifty years. The
issue of religion and the public airwaves reveals the tensions
that result from such a course. Unfortunately, the public policy
debate surrounding the issue seems likely to remain at a level
far removed from the deep concerns raised here. The deci-
sions with regard to religious broadcasting will continue to deal
with side issues. If, however, the broader constitutional issues
are reached (and it is probable that they will not be), the course
that ultimately will be more beneficial to religion, our constitu-
tional values, and to the American people, will be to remove
religious broadcasting from the public airwaves altogether.
241. See supra notes 2 and 3.
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